















Solution .	CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION				Slide No. 8						
Source	KISK Analysis										
	<ul> <li><u>Example 2 (cont'd)</u>: Identification of Risk in a Water Pipeline System         <ul> <li>Example failure scenarios</li> </ul> </li> <li>Failures Possibilities and Their Impacts on Water Pipeline System</li> </ul>										
H	Source of Failure	Type of Failure Total or Partial	Impact on Syste Consequences Partial System Failure								
	Failure of Branch 1 onlyFailure of Branch 2 onlyFailure of Branch 3 onlyFailure of Branch 1 and 2 onlyFailure of Branch 1 and 3 onlyFailure of Branch 2 and 3 onlyFailure of Branch 2 and 3 onlyFailure of Branch 1, 2 and 3	[1] 01 [F]       T       T       T       T       T       T       T       T       T       T	P P	T           T           T           T           T           T           T           T           T           T							







CH.	APTER 1. INTRODUC	TION			Slide No. 1		
R	Risk Analysis- Example 4						
	Source of Risk in the Project Stages 1. Feasibility study	Failure State Delay	Cause of Failure Feasibility stage is delayed due to complexities and uncertainties associated with the system.	Effect on the Project The four stages of the project will be delayed causing problems to the client's financial and investment obligations.	-		
Ĩ	2. Preliminary design	Approval not granted	The preliminary design is not approved for various reasons caused by the architect, engineer, project planner, or project manager	The detailed design will not be ready for zoning and planning approval, and for the selection process of contractors causing delay accumulation in finishing the project leading to additional financial burdens on the client	-		
	3. Detailed design	Delay	The detailed design performed by the architect/engineer is delayed.	The project management activities cannot be performed efficiently, and the contractor cannot start work properly causing delays in the execution of the project.	-		
	4. Execution and implementation	Delay or disruption	The execution and implementation stage is delayed or disrupted as a result of accidents.	The project will definitely not be finish on time and will be completed over budget causing serious financial problems to the client.	-		
	5. Disposal or termination	Delay	The termination stage is delayed or not scheduled.	The system will become unreliable and hazardous causing customer complaints and the increasing client's contractual obligation problems.	-		











Part of the second	CHAPTE	R 1. INTRODUCT	ION					Slide N	<b>∖o. 17</b>			
- <b>N</b>	System Framework (cont'd)											
<ul> <li><u>Example 7</u>: System Boundary Identification for a Fire Escape System</li> </ul>												
H		Source of Risk as an Adverse Event	Escape Scenarios	Smoke Workin Success	Detector g fully	Occupa Manage Escape	ints ed to	Consequences in terms of Life Loss				
				Yes	No	Yes	No					
		Fire	Scenario 1	Yes		Yes		No Injury				
		initiated	Scenario 2	Yes			No	Death				
		in an	Scenario 3		No	Yes		Sever Injury				
		apartment	Scenario 4		No		No	Death				
				I	1	I	1	1				



















































Ignorance Hierarchy (cont'd)					
Table A. Taxonomy of Ignorance					
Term	Meaning				
1. Blind ignorance	Ignorance of self-ignorance or called meta-ignorance.				
1.1. Unknowable	Knowledge that cannot be attained by humans based on current evolutionary progressions, or cannot be attained at all due to human limitations, or can only be attained through quantum leaps by humans.				
1.2. Irrelevance	Ignoring something.				
1.2.1. Untopicality	Intuitions of experts that could not be negotiated with others in terms of cognitive relevance.				
1.2.2. Taboo	Socially reinforced irrelevance. Issues that people must not know, deal with, inquire about, or investigate.				
1.2.3. Undecidability	Issues that cannot be designated true or false because they are considered insoluble, or solutions that are not verifiable, or ignoratio elenchi.				
1.3. Fallacy	Erroneous belief due to misleading notions.				

and and		CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	Slide No. 44
	RCR PORT	Ignorance H	ierarchy (cont'd)
		Table A. (cont'd)	Taxonomy of Ignorance
		2. Conscious ignorance	A recognized self-ignorance through reflection.
		2.1. Inconsistency	Inconsistency in knowledge can be attributed to distorted information as a result of inaccuracy, conflict, contradiction, and/or confusion.
		2.1.1. Confusion	Wrongful substitutions.
-		2.1.2. Conflict	Conflicting or contradictory assignments or substitutions.
		2.1.3. Inaccuracy	Bias and distortion in degree.
		2.2. Incompleteness	Incomplete knowledge due to absence or uncertainty.
		2.2.1. Absence	Incompleteness in kind.
		2.2.2. Unknowns	The difference between the <i>becoming</i> knowledge state and <i>current</i> knowledge state
		2.2.3. Uncertainty	Knowledge incompleteness due to inherent deficiencies with acquired knowledge.
		2.2.3.1. Ambiguity	The possibility of having multi-outcomes for processes or systems.
		a) Unspecificity	Outcomes or assignments that are not completely defined.
H		b) Nonspecificity	Outcomes or assignments that are improperly defined.

Contraction of the second	1000	CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	Slide No. 45
.A.	anut	Ignorance Hie	erarchy (cont'd)
		Table A. (cont'd) Tax	konomy of Ignorance
		2.2.3.2. Approximations	A process that involves the use of vague semantics in language, approximate reasoning, and dealing with complexity by emphasizing relevance.
		a) Vagueness	Non-crispness of belonging and non-belonging of elements to a set or a notion of interest.
		b) Coarseness	Approximating a crisp set by subsets of an underlying partition of the set's universe that would bound the set of interest.
		c) Simplifications	Assumptions needed to make problems and solutions tractable.
		2.2.3.3. Likelihood	Defined by its components of randomness, statistical and modeling.
		a) Randomness	Non-predictability of outcomes.
		b) Sampling	Samples versus populations.



Validation

Interval

analysis















Ning and	CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION Slide No. 54										
. <b>N</b>	Information Uncertainty in Engineering										
	Systems (cont'd)										
	Example 8: Human Knowledge and										
		gnorar	nce in F	Fire E	sca	ipe	Sys	stems			
	Source of Escape Risk as an Scenarios Adverse Event			Smoke Detector Working Successfully		Occupants Managed to Escape		Consequences in terms of Life Loss			
				Yes	No	Yes	No				
		Fire	Scenario 1	Yes		Yes		No Injury			
		initiated	Scenario 2	Yes			No	Death			
		in an	Scenario 3		No	Yes		Sever Injury			
		apartment	Scenario 4		No		No	Death			







